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I. Executive Summary 
1 A matrimonial order of divorce, nullity or legal separation is often followed by 
ancillary orders relating to division of matrimonial property, custody of children and 
maintenance. Under Singapore law, many of the court’s powers in respect of these 
types of orders depend on the court having jurisdiction to pronounce on the status of the 
marriage. If an order made by a foreign court is recognised to have annulled or 
dissolved the marriage, then it is not possible for the Singapore court to assume 
jurisdiction in respect of the marriage; there is no marriage to speak of anymore. The 
legal consequence is that the court will lack certain crucial powers to grant ancillary 
orders. The size of the problem caused by this lacuna in the law depends on a number 
of factors.  
2 Firstly, the wider the rules of Singapore’s private international law on the 
recognition of foreign matrimonial decrees, the larger will be the scope of the problem 
because such recognition effectively ousts the court’s powers to grant ancillary relief. 
The trend in Singapore law has been an expansion of the grounds of recognition, 
broadly in line with international developments.  
3 Secondly, the more restricted the law is on the enforceability of foreign 
ancillary orders, the more pressing will be the need to close the gap in the Singapore 
court’s ancillary matrimonial jurisdiction. Generally, the law does not recognise foreign 
custody orders because the court’s own view on the welfare of the child is of 
paramount importance. Foreign maintenance orders have limited enforcement channels 
within Singapore. Foreign orders affecting property generally have no effect on rights 
in property situated outside the jurisdiction of the court granting the order; the lex situs 
rule is an ancient and established one. Except in the case of foreign maintenance orders 
(which is the subject of another paper), there are generally good reasons why these 
rules are restrictive. In any event, reform in these areas will only partially address the 
problem, as the foreign court may have made no orders at all. 
4 Thirdly, common law courts apply the doctrine of natural forum, under which it 
may decline to exercise jurisdiction if there is another court of competent jurisdiction 
which is in a better position to deal with the dispute in the interests of the parties and 
the ends of justice. This doctrine applies to the matrimonial jurisdiction too, and this is 
also broadly consistent with developments in other commonwealth countries. The result 
of declining jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings is that a foreign court will dissolve 
the marriage, depriving the Singapore court of powers to grant ancillary relief. 
5 Fourthly, the problem will be minimised to the extent that there are powers 
which are not dependent on the court having power to pronounce on the marriage in 
question. Thus, the problem is most acute in respect of financial relief in the form of 
division of matrimonial property and maintenance after the dissolution of a marriage, 
where there is little or no power outside this ancillary jurisdiction. On the other hand, 
the court has fairly wide independent powers to deal with the custody of children. 
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6 Practically, the seriousness of the problems caused by the lacuna depends on the 
social pattern of cross-border marriages and divorces actually taking place affecting 
people who will need access to the Singapore courts. It may be noted that the number 
of marriages between Singaporeans and foreigners has been rising. A Singaporean may 
marry a foreigner in a foreign country and they then live in Singapore in a matrimonial 
home registered in the sole name of one of the parties. If one spouse obtains a divorce 
from a foreign court which makes no financial provisions, and that decree is recognised 
under Singapore law, the other spouse will have no financial remedies in Singapore, 
whether in terms of division of matrimonial assets or maintenance claims. 
7 It is proposed that the Women’s Charter be amended so that the Singapore court 
will have the power to order financial relief after a foreign divorce or annulment of 
marriage or legal separation. The powers will be co-extensive with and exercised on the 
same discretionary grounds as if the court had original matrimonial jurisdiction. All 
circumstances will be taken into consideration, including the foreign dimensions of the 
case and the existence and effectiveness of orders (if any) made by the relevant foreign 
court. There is a risk of abuse of the expanded powers, so certain safeguards are also 
recommended. Thus, the applicant must first seek permission to apply for this relief, 
and permission may be denied if the parties do not have sufficient connections with 
Singapore, or if the applicant has not demonstrated substantial grounds for relief, or 
Singapore is not the appropriate venue to provide such relief. 
II. Terms of Reference 
8 When parties have obtained, or are in the course of obtaining, a matrimonial 
decree from the Singapore court, the court has the power to grant important ancillary 
orders to deal with the aftermath of the break-up. The most important of these are 
orders for the maintenance of the wife and children, the custody of children of the 
marriage and the division of matrimonial assets. However, if the parties have already 
obtained a matrimonial decree from abroad and that decree is entitled to recognition 
under the private international law of Singapore, then such powers, being ancillary to 
the matrimonial jurisdiction of the Singapore court which can no longer be invoked, do 
not exist under the current legislative framework. Put simply, if a foreign court has 
validly pronounced that a marriage is a nullity or has terminated, there is no marriage 
for the Singapore court to deal with, and therefore the court has no power to grant any 
order that is ancillary to its matrimonial jurisdiction. The sub-committee is asked to 
consider whether, and if so, how, the jurisdiction of the court should be extended to 
cover these situations. 
9 The problem under consideration is exemplified in the case of Ng Sui Wah 
Novina v Chandra Michael Setiawan.1 W, a Hong Kong citizen, married H, an 
Indonesian citizen, in Indonesia in 1978, and lived there until 1984 when W left with 
                                                 
1 Ng Sui Wah Novina v Chandra Michael Setiawan [1992] 2 SLR 839 (“Setiawan”). 
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their child for Hong Kong. W subsequently left for Canada in 1986 and became a 
citizen there. H had commenced divorce proceedings in Jakarta in 1986, and W was not 
present when the court granted a divorce in 1987. In the decree, custody of the child 
was awarded to W and H had agreed to pay monthly maintenance for the child. In 
1991, W commenced proceedings in Singapore against H (who was then a permanent 
resident of Singapore), asking for maintenance for herself and the child. The High 
Court dismissed W’s claim, on the basis that the power to order maintenance for a 
former wife or a child of a dissolved marriage was ancillary to its matrimonial 
jurisdiction, which could not be invoked in this case because the Indonesian divorce 
decree was recognised in Singapore. 
10 Whatever the merits of the case itself,2 this decision demonstrates that 
irrespective of the merits of the case, the Singapore court has no power to grant 
ancillary relief once a foreign matrimonial decree is recognised. Although they did not 
arise in that case, it is possible that the court in such circumstances may also be 
requested to make custody orders or orders in respect of the division of matrimonial 
assets. Such cross-border problems are likely to become more common, with the 
increasing mobility of the population in Asia and elsewhere in the world, and especially 
as the external wing of the Singapore economy grows and the population becomes 
more cosmopolitan and widely-travelled, and as Singapore welcomes more and more 
foreigners. The number of cross-border marriages in Singapore has been on the rise.3 
11 In Ho Ah Chye v Hsinchieh Hsu Irene,4 H, a Singapore citizen and domiciliary, 
had married W, then a Taiwanese national, in 1980 in New Jersey, USA, where H had 
been a student. The marriage was subsequently registered in Singapore, and they made 
their matrimonial home in Singapore. It is not clear how long the couple lived in 
Singapore after that, but by 1987, W was living in California and had obtained a 
divorce decree there which was recognised under Singapore private international law. 
The Californian proceedings were uncontested, and the parties agreed before the 
Californian court that they held no matrimonial property in community, which was of 
course technically true. H then applied to the Singapore court for the division of the 
matrimonial home (held in their joint names) in Singapore. This case is somewhat 
problematic because the court assumed that it had the jurisdiction to do so in spite the 
recognition of the foreign divorce (a point addressed at paragraphs 15–16), but it is 
thought that there is a lacuna in the law if the Singapore court is unable to act in these 
circumstances. Given the increasing number of Singapore residents marrying foreign 
spouses, there is an increasing risk of social problems arising from foreign spouses 
subsequently obtaining foreign divorce decrees leaving the Singapore spouse, who may 
not have the resources to contest foreign proceedings, with no effective remedy under 
                                                 
2 See para 40. 
3 See, eg, “French dad? Local mum? You’re right at home in S’pore: If you have both a Singaporean dad 
and a Singaporean mum, you may soon be in the minority in Singapore”, New Paper (24 August 2008), 
where it was reported that only 57% of babies born in Singapore today have both parents of Singapore 
nationality. 
4 Ho Ah Chye v Hsinchieh Hsu Irene [1994] 2 SLR 316. 
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Singapore law.5 As another example, a male Singapore citizen may marry a foreign 
female in a foreign country, and the female then becomes a citizen and they both live in 
Singapore in a home owned in the name of the husband. Years later, the husband 
obtains a divorce from a foreign country (which may or may not be the same foreign 
country) and that divorce is recognised under Singapore law. There being no marriage 
for the Singapore court to assume jurisdiction over, the divorced wife will have no 
remedies in Singapore. 
12 In this report, the sub-committee first outlines the existing legal framework and 
the gaps in the law before examining the policy question whether the gap should be 
filled, and if so, the options for reform. The recommendations are contained in the final 
part of this report. 
III. The Existing Law 
A. Ancillary orders 
13 The Women’s Charter provides for various ancillary powers to deal with the 
aftermath of the breakdown of a marriage. The court may order a man to pay 
maintenance to his wife or ex-wife during the course of matrimonial proceedings or 
when granting or subsequent to the grant of a judgment of divorce, judicial separation 
or nullity.6 The court may also order a parent to pay maintenance for his or her child in 
the course of pending matrimonial proceedings or when granting or subsequent to the 
grant of a judgment of divorce, judicial separation or nullity.7 The court may make a 
custody order in respect of a child at any stage of matrimonial proceedings for divorce, 
judicial separation or nullity, or after such a final judgment has been given.8 The court 
                                                 
5 One important motivation for the English law reform discussed below was “the presence, in the United 
Kingdom, of a large number of people who have a sufficient connection with a foreign country, such as 
Pakistan, probably by citizenship and domicile, to enable a man to take proceedings for divorce in that 
country, although his wife and children are, and may for many years have been, resident in England.” Sir 
Ralph Gibson, “The Recent Proposals of the Law Commission for Reform in Family Law” (1983) Law 
Lectures for Practitioners 121 at 124–125, <http://sunzi1.lib.hku.hk/hkjo/view/14/1400054.pdf> (accessed 
8 March 2009). 
6 Section 113 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) states: 
The court may order a man to pay maintenance to his wife or former wife— 
(a) during the course of any matrimonial proceedings; or 
(b) when granting or subsequent to the grant of a judgment of divorce, judicial 
separation or nullity of marriage. 
7 “During the pendency of any matrimonial proceedings or when granting or at any time subsequent to the 
grant of a judgment of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, the court may order a parent to 
pay maintenance for the benefit of his child in such manner as the court thinks fit”: Women’s Charter 
(Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) s 127(1). 
8 “In any proceedings for divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, the court may, at any stage of 
the proceedings, or after a final judgment has been granted, make such orders as it thinks fit with respect to 
the welfare of any child and may vary or discharge the said orders, and may, if it thinks fit, direct that 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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may also order the division of matrimonial property when or after granting a judgment 
of divorce, judicial separation or nullity.9 
14 These powers all depend on the invocation of the matrimonial jurisdiction of the 
Singapore court.10 As a preliminary point, the issue of ancillary relief is a matter 
governed by Singapore law, as statutory power in Singapore legislation is being 
invoked.11 As illustrated in the Setiawan case, such powers cannot be invoked where 
there is a foreign divorce or nullity decree preventing the invocation of the matrimonial 
jurisdiction. 
B. Bare declarations 
15 These ancillary powers of the court also do not apply in the case of an 
application for a bare declaration that the marriage is a nullity or has been dissolved. It 
is therefore not open to a party to rely on the foreign decree in order to seek a 
declaration from the Singapore court to invoke the ancillary powers. However, in Ho 
Ah Chye v Hsinchieh Hsu Irene,12 the High Court appeared to have proceeded on the 
assumption that it had jurisdiction to decide on the division of matrimonial property 
upon granting a declaration of marital status following the recognition of a foreign 
divorce decree. The jurisdictional point was, however, not argued. 
16 In the domestic context, there is no reason to extend the ancillary powers to 
cases of bare declarations, as petitions for nullity should be the normal route, and bare 
                                                                                                                      
proceedings be commenced for placing the child under the protection of the court”: Women’s Charter 
(Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) s 124. 
9 “The court shall have power, when granting or subsequent to the grant of a judgment of divorce, judicial 
separation or nullity of marriage, to order the division between the parties of any matrimonial asset or the 
sale of any such asset and the division between the parties of the proceeds of the sale of any such asset in 
such proportions as the court thinks just and equitable”: Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) 
s 112(1). 
10 Section 93 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) states: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court shall have jurisdiction to hear proceedings for 
divorce, presumption of death and divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage only if 
either of the parties to the marriage is— 
(a) domiciled in Singapore at the time of the commencement of the proceedings; 
or 
(b) habitually resident in Singapore for a period of 3 years immediately 
preceding the commencement of the proceedings. 
(2) In proceedings for nullity of marriage on the ground that the marriage is void or 
voidable, the court may, notwithstanding that the requirements in subsection (1) are not fulfilled, 
grant the relief sought where both parties to the marriage reside in Singapore at the time of the 
commencement of the proceedings. 
(3) For the purposes of proceedings for nullity of marriage, “marriage” includes a 
marriage which is not valid by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act. 
11 TQ v TR [2009] 2 SLR 961 at [42]. 
12 Ho Ah Chye v Hsinchieh Hsu Irene [1994] 2 SLR 316 at [40]. 
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declarations should be allowed only in very exceptional situations, as where the party 
seeking the declaration is not a party to the marriage.13 Bare declarations therefore do 
not present a practical problem for domestic cases. The problem whether parties are to 
be allowed to seek the assistance of the court after a foreign matrimonial judgment 
should be confronted outright and not resolved through this route because of the side-
effect on domestic cases.  
IV. Extent of the Problem 
17 The extent that the ancillary nature of the abovementioned powers presents a 
practical problem in Singapore is affected by four other legal factors: firstly, the extent 
to which foreign matrimonial decrees will be recognised in Singapore; secondly, the 
extent to which foreign orders relating to maintenance, custody or division of property 
(whether in their nature ancillary to a foreign decree of status or not) can be recognised 
or enforced in Singapore; thirdly, the extent to which non-ancillary or independent 
powers of the Singapore court can be invoked in such situations; and fourthly, the 
extent to which matrimonial and related disputes involving foreign elements are stayed 
in favour of litigation in foreign jurisdictions. 
A. Recognition of foreign decrees on matrimonial status 
18 The size of the lacuna in Singapore law is defined by the extent to which the 
matrimonial jurisdiction of the Singapore court is ousted by the recognition of a foreign 
status decree. The legal trend in Singapore shows the facilitation of greater recognition 
of foreign decrees. 
19 The question of the recognition of foreign matrimonial decrees in Singapore is 
today governed entirely by common law principles.14 A foreign matrimonial decree will 
be recognised if it originates from a court of competent jurisdiction and is not otherwise 
impeached for fraud, breach of natural justice or contravention of the fundamental 
public policy of the forum. Under Singapore law, the foreign court will be regarded as 
jurisdictionally competent if it is the court of the domicile of either party to the 
marriage,15 or if the foreign court had assumed jurisdiction on facts that if they had 
been transposed to Singapore the Singapore court would have assumed matrimonial 
                                                 
13 See, eg, Racaza Juliet S v Caton David Andrew [2004] SGDC 275 at [38], citing Moh Ah Kiu v Central 
Provident Fund Board [1992] 2 SLR 569. 
14 Section 108 of the Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) preserves the application of private 
international law to questions of the validity of a marriage, which foreign divorce and nullity decrees 
clearly affect: see Ho Ah Chye v Hsinchieh Hsu Irene [1994] 2 SLR 316. After 1996, following the 
Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 1996 (Act 30 of 1996) repealing the ambiguous s 85 of the Women’s 
Charter, which required the application of English law in specified circumstances, the problem whether 
English legislation expanding the common law grounds of recognition could be applied in Singapore no 
longer vexed Singapore law. 
15 Asha Maudgil v Suresh Kumar Gosain [1994] 2 SLR 709. 
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jurisdiction (reciprocity) or if there is a real and substantial connection between the 
foreign country and either party to the marriage.16 These grounds are not necessarily 
exhaustive, as the courts have not been asked to consider whether residence of either 
party, where it does not also fall within the reciprocity or real and substantial 
connection grounds, would be a sufficient jurisdictional basis.17 Even without further 
expansion, the established grounds of recognition are already wide. 
20 The defences to recognition, on the other hand, will remain narrow as long as 
the Singapore court continues to take the approach that it will be very reluctant to 
criticise the standards of justice applied by foreign courts,18 and this trend appears very 
likely to stay if recent authorities outside the family law context on the amount of 
respect to be given to pronouncements by foreign courts are any guide.19 
21 While this means that the courts in Singapore are taking a laudable broad-
minded approach towards the recognition of foreign matrimonial pronouncements and 
thereby avoiding as much as possible the problem of limping marriages, one side-effect 
is that the scope for invoking the court’s own matrimonial jurisdiction is thereby 
restricted, and with it the powers of the court ancillary to such jurisdiction. As a matter 
of policy, however, it is not desirable to narrow the grounds of jurisdictional 
competence of the foreign court or to expand the scope of defences in order to allow for 
greater scope for the use of the ancillary powers of the local matrimonial jurisdiction; it 
is simply the wrong tool. 
B. Recognition and enforcement of foreign orders 
22 The lack of powers of the court in its ancillary matrimonial jurisdiction will not 
be so serious if foreign orders can be recognised or enforced in the forum. This will 
alleviate the gap in Singapore law to the extent that the foreign court has indeed made 
such orders, and such orders have legal effect in Singapore. However, there are serious 
restrictions on the legal effect of such orders under Singapore law. 
                                                 
16 Ho Ah Chye v Hsinchieh Hsu Irene [1994] 2 SLR 316. 
17 For example, where only the petitioner was resident in the foreign country, and for only three months 
preceding the commencement of the foreign proceedings (this will fall outside s 93(1) of the Women’s 
Charter in the case of divorce proceedings and s 93(2) in the case of nullity proceedings). 
18 See Ng Sui Wah Novina v Chandra Michael Setiawan [1992] 2 SLR 839 at 846–847, [27]–[28]. 
19 Liao Eng Kiat v Burswood Nominess Ltd [2004] 4 SLR 690 (CA); Wu Shun Foods Co Ltd v Ken Ken Food 
Manufacturing Pte Ltd [2002] 4 SLR 877. It is widely acknowledged, however, that the content of the 
forum’s fundamental public policy is such that it will probably be found applicable in more family law 
cases than in commercial law cases. 
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(1) Maintenance 
23 In a separate report, the sub-committee has dealt with the difficulties relating to 
the reciprocal enforcement of foreign maintenance orders in Singapore. It is not so easy 
to enforce a foreign maintenance order in Singapore if it is not from a gazetted country. 
24 It is not clear whether the foreign maintenance order, at least where the foreign 
court had international in personam jurisdiction over the defendant according to the 
private international law of Singapore, can create an issue estoppel that the defendant 
owes the plaintiff an obligation of maintenance, which can then be sued upon like any 
other obligation in the Singapore court. Whether this is possible depends on whether 
the foreign maintenance order was giving effect to an antecedent substantive right to 
maintenance, or was creating a relief. An estoppel is only possible in the former case; 
no estoppel can arise in respect of the judicial relief of the foreign court. Even so, suing 
on the obligation in the forum will challenge the limits of characterisation in private 
international law, for there is practically no corresponding cause of action in domestic 
Singapore law: almost all maintenance claims are a matter of judicial relief only,20 the 
only substantive maintenance obligation (parents’ duty to maintain a child) is purely 
defined by statute and governed by Singapore law.21 Further difficulties arise even if 
the characterisation hurdle is cleared. If the claim is governed by Singapore law, only 
the child is protected. If the claim is governed by foreign law, then it can run into the 
difficulty that a claim that requires considerations of factors which are peculiarly within 
the domain or competence of a foreign tribunal may not be exigible in the forum.22 
(2) Custody 
25 There is some uncertainty surrounding the recognition or enforcement of 
foreign custody orders in Singapore law. The traditional approach in the common law is 
that the principle of the paramountcy of the welfare of the child is a mandatory 
principle in the private international law sense, and that therefore foreign custody 
orders will not be regarded as binding in the forum, although due respect will be given 
to the foreign order. However, the subordinate court in Singapore appears to have 
suggested that a foreign custody order is capable of having binding effect in Singapore 
if it is from the country of the habitual residence of the child.23 While this case may be 
read as giving legal effect to a foreign custody order, what the court actually did was, in 
the course of applying Singapore law under its ancillary power to deal with custody, to 
say that the paramountcy principle of the forum required that the decision on custody 
by the court of the habitual residence of the child should generally be followed unless 
there were exceptional circumstances.24 Whether as a matter of principle, the 
                                                 
20 See paras 29 and 31. The same for the maintenance claims under the ancillary matrimonial jurisdiction: see 
para 11. 
21 See para 30. 
22 Phrantzes v Argenti [1960] 2 QB 19. 
23 AB v AC [2004] SGDC 6. 
24 AB v AC [2004] SGDC 6 at [21]. 
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paramountcy principle can be so constrained is a matter of doubt.25 In any event, 
a foreign custody order even from habitual residence of the child will not be directly 
enforceable, and requires the invocation of either the (ancillary) jurisdiction under the 
Women’s Charter – which will not be possible if there is no longer a marriage for the 
Singapore court to deal with – or the independent jurisdiction under the Guardianship 
of Infants Act which requires a sufficient jurisdictional connection between the child 
and Singapore.26 
(3) Division of assets 
26 The legal effect in the forum of a foreign order as to the division of matrimonial 
assets depends on the nature of the order itself. Insofar as it is an order in rem declaring 
title to property (or the sale of property and title to proceeds), the judicial order will be 
recognised as a judgment in rem if the property, whether movable or immovable, lies 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the foreign court at the time of the commencement 
of the proceedings. This is effectively an application of the lex situs principle. In so far 
as the order compels a party to do a certain act in respect of property, whether movable 
or immovable and wherever situate, it is an order in personam, and the rules for the 
recognition and enforcement of in personam orders apply. Under the existing common 
law, only money judgments are enforceable.27 Thus, a foreign order dividing up 
property situated in the forum will not be enforceable in the forum.28 Recourse to the 
Singapore court after a foreign matrimonial judgment is most likely to be in respect of 
assets in Singapore, but these are cases where the foreign orders are least likely to have 
any legal effect in Singapore.29 
                                                 
25 In Re J (a child) [2005] 3 WLR 14, [2005] UKHL 14, it was held that the English courts should not extend 
the principles of the Hague Convention on Child Abduction to countries beyond the Convention. Outside 
of the Convention, the common law paramountcy principle requires that each case should be examined on 
its own merits. 
26 See para 34. In AB v AC [2004] SGDC 6, the child was a citizen of Singapore. 
27 Contrast, however, the law of Canada: Pro Swing Inc v Elta Golf Inc [2006] 2 SCR 612; 2006 SCC 52. 
28 Especially for immovable property in the forum: Duke v Andler [1932] SCR 734. Community matrimonial 
property regimes call for separate considerations which do not arise here. See, eg, Murakami Takako v 
Wiryadi Louise Maria [2007] 1 SLR 1119 and [2007] 4 SLR 565 (CA) at [45]. Murakami Takako v 
Wiryadi Louise Maria is itself an unusual case as it dealt with an order from the court of the country which 
law was held to govern the issue of matrimonial property; in so far as it suggests any broader proposition 
as to the enforcement of foreign in personam orders to transfer property, it must be understood from in the 
context of (a) the concession by counsel of the enforceability of such orders; (b) the application of the law 
governing matrimonial assets; and (c) the interlocutory nature of the decision in allowing certain 
amendments to the pleadings in the case. Similarly, the observation in Murakami Takako v Wiryadi Louise 
Maria [2009] 1 SLR 508 (CA) at [36] that an Indonesian judgment ordering the transfer of property in 
Australia can be enforceable in Australia (which applies similar common law conflict of laws rules as 
Singapore) is premised on the basis that the Australian court recognises Indonesian law to govern the issue 
of matrimonial property in respect of the property in Australia (see Murakami v Wiryadi [2006] 
NSWSC 1354 at [48]–[49]). 
29 See, however, text to n 52. The in personam rights to property in Singapore pronounced by the foreign 
court may, however, be recognised by the Singapore court if the foreign court had international 
jurisdiction over the party sought to be bound by the right pronounced under the in personam order: Pattni 
v Ali [2007] 2 WLR 102 (PC, Isle of Man) at [27]. It is not clear, however, whether this international 
jurisdiction is established by the rules for in personam judgments generally (ie, presence, residence or 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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27 It is possible for the foreign judgment to create an in personam estoppel with 
respect to an antecedent substantive obligation to transfer property. However, division 
of matrimonial assets almost invariably involves the creative jurisdiction of the court in 
the transfer of title. 
C. Independent powers 
28 If the ancillary powers of the courts cannot be resorted to, then it may still be 
possible for the party to invoke such powers of the court that are not ancillary to the 
matrimonial jurisdiction. To the extent that this can be done, the lacuna in Singapore 
law becomes less serious a practical problem. However, such independent powers of 
the court are not as extensive as the powers found in the court’s matrimonial 
jurisdiction. 
(1) Maintenance of wife 
29 Under the Women’s Charter, the court may order a husband to provide 
maintenance for his wife upon an application by the wife.30 This appears to be a matter 
of judicial relief so only the law of the forum is applicable. The jurisdictional scope is 
unclear. In any event, the provision is confined to an application by a “married 
woman”, and the woman would no longer have that status upon the recognition of a 
foreign decree of nullity or divorce.31 This provision will therefore not be of assistance 
to an ex-wife in Singapore. However, if the woman had obtained a maintenance order 
from the Singapore court prior to the grant of the final foreign decree, the order is 
probably still valid for the order does not necessarily lapse upon change of marital 
status,32 at least until remarriage.33 
                                                                                                                      
submission), or that it is merely parasitic to the main matrimonial jurisdiction of the foreign court to which 
the division order was ancillary. See Murakami Takako v Wiryadi Louse Maria [2007] 4 SLR 565 at [46], 
but it is not clear what the basis of the international jurisdiction was. It is also not clear whether the foreign 
obligation to transfer property recognised under the conflict of laws rules of the forum causes beneficial 
title to shift in respect of property in the forum (ie, the lex situs); see n 75. 
30 “Any married woman whose husband neglects or refuses to provide her reasonable maintenance may apply 
to a District Court or a Magistrate’s Court and that Court may, on due proof thereof, order the husband to 
pay a monthly allowance or a lump sum for her maintenance”: Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) 
s 69(1). 
31 This was the case in Ng Sui Wah Novina v Chandra Michael Setiawan [1992] 2 SLR 839. 
32 Wood v Wood [1957] P 254 (CA). The ex-wife may further apply for variation as such applications are not 
linked to her status at the time of such application (s 72). 
33 Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) s 117. 
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(2) Maintenance of child 
30 Under the Women’s Charter, the court may order a parent to provide reasonable 
maintenance for his or her child.34 Although the child’s entitlement to maintenance in 
this provision is a substantive right conferred by statute,35 because it is a right 
specifically created by statute without any common law antecedents, whether there is 
choice of law in respect of such a right is a matter of statutory construction, and the 
current wording appears to leave no room for the application of any law but the law of 
the forum.36 The jurisdictional scope of this provision is unclear. On the face of it, the 
Act applies to all persons in, or domiciled in, Singapore.37 It is not clear whether 
jurisdiction is to be tested with reference to the applicant, the respondent, or the child, 
or a combination thereof. On the face of it, transient presence of the petitioner38 would 
satisfy the test of being “in” Singapore. Thus, on one interpretation, it was open to the 
ex-wife in a case like Setiawan, being in Singapore and having actual custody of the 
child,39 to make an application against her ex-husband under this provision for the 
maintenance of the child, but this requires a broad interpretation, perhaps too broad, of 
the territorial scope of the statute. The territorial scope of the provision is very 
ambiguous, and an interpretation that is consistent with international comity may 
require a stronger jurisdictional link between the forum and the child. 
31 Under the Guardianship of Infants Act, the court may, upon the application of 
either parent or a guardian appointed under the Act, order the payment towards 
maintenance of an infant.40 This appears to be a matter of judicial relief so no choice of 
law is applicable. There is no visible clue as to its territorial scope within the statute, 
but it has been assumed that the statute tracks the common law inherent jurisdiction of 
the court as the ultimate guardian of all children falling under the protection of its 
sovereign.41 This inherent jurisdiction is premised on the child being a national of the 
state, or being resident or present in the jurisdiction at the time of the commencement 
of the proceedings. The purpose of the statute is to look after the interests of the child 
as such, and so the jurisdiction connection is naturally focussed on the child. This 
                                                 
34 “A District Court or a Magistrate’s Court may, on due proof that a parent has neglected or refused to 
provide reasonable maintenance for his child who is unable to maintain himself, order that parent to pay a 
monthly allowance or a lump sum for the maintenance of that child”: Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 
1997 Rev Ed) s 69(2). 
35 Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) s 68. 
36 Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) ss 68–69. Tan Yock Lin, Conflicts Issues in Family and 
Succession Law (Butterworths Asia, 1993) at p 298. 
37 Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) s 3(1). 
38 The respondent was apparently resident in Singapore. 
39 Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 1997 Rev Ed) s 69(3)(a). 
40 “The court may, upon the application of either parent or of any guardian appointed under this Act, make 
orders as it may think fit regarding the custody of such infant, the right of access thereto and the payment 
of any sum towards the maintenance of the infant and may alter, vary or discharge such order on the 
application of either parent or of any guardian appointed under this Act”: Women’s Charter (Cap 353, 
1997 Rev Ed) s 5. 
41 Re Sinyak Rayoon (1888) 4 Ky 329. 
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provision may not be available in a situation like the Setiawan case (where the child 
was not so connected to Singapore), where the main objective of the Singapore 
litigation was to deal with the aftermath of a marital break-up. 
32 Maintenance may also be ordered against parents in favour of children under the 
Children and Young Persons Act,42 but these are specific to situations where the child 
is being protected by the court, and do not apply to the situations under consideration in 
this paper. 
33 The question whether it is possible to sue independently on a maintenance 
obligation as a cause of action subject to the conflict of laws has been discussed 
above.43 
(3) Custody of child 
34 Under the Guardianship of Infants Act, the court may, upon the application of 
either parent or a guardian appointed under the Act, make any order in respect the 
custody of an infant.44 The same jurisdictional and choice of law considerations 
discussed above in relationship to maintenance under this Act45 apply. 
35 It should also be noted that for the purpose of maintenance and custody of 
children, the respective scope of protection under the ancillary matrimonial jurisdiction 
of the Women’s Charter and under the Guardianship of Infants Act are not identical. 
While in the latter, only parents46 and guardians have standing to make applications to 
the court,47 the former extends its protection to children from a previous marriage, and 
also children who may turn out not to be the biological child of one of the parties to the 
marriage. Thus, even if the jurisdictional differences do not have much practical 
significance, a lacuna could still arise in situations where the issues involve step-
children or possibly a non-biological parent. 
                                                 
42 Children and Young Persons Act (Cap 38, 2001 Rev Ed) ss 49 and 84. 
43 See para 24. 
44 “The court may, upon the application of either parent or of any guardian appointed under this Act, make 
orders as it may think fit regarding the custody of such infant, the right of access thereto and the payment 
of any sum towards the maintenance of the infant and may alter, vary or discharge such order on the 
application of either parent or of any guardian appointed under this Act”: Guardianship of Infants Act 
(Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed) s 5. 
45 See para 31. 
46 The natural meaning would be a biological parent. However, s 114 of the Evidence Act (Cap 97, 
1997 Rev Ed) contains a legal presumption that a child born in wedlock is the child of the parties to the 
marriage unless it can be shown that the parties had no access to each other at the time of conception. On 
the other hand, DNA evidence had been accepted in matrimonial disputes to determine the biological 
parenthood of a child born in wedlock: Re A (an infant) [2002] 1 SLR 310. See Debbie Ong & Valerie 
Thean, “Family Law” (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev 224 at 235–236, paras 13.23–13.24. 
47 Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 1985 Rev Ed) s 5. 
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(4) Division of property 
36 The Singapore court has no power to divide matrimonial assets apart from its 
power ancillary to the matrimonial jurisdiction. Although there is independent power to 
decide any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of 
property,48 this power is declaratory only.49 It provides a procedure for the court to 
pronounce on their existing property rights in accordance with the law (including 
choice of law where applicable), but does not allow the courts to alter property rights 
between the parties. Moreover, the procedure is limited to questions between “husband 
and wife” only, a relationship that is dissolved by the recognition of a foreign divorce 
or nullity decree. 
D. Natural forum 
37 The Singapore court applies the doctrine of natural forum in matrimonial cases. 
The court will stay matrimonial proceedings commenced in Singapore if there is a 
clearly more appropriate forum available elsewhere unless substantive justice will be 
denied by the stay of proceedings.50 Matrimonial proceedings that are stayed in favour 
of foreign proceedings are only suspended, and therefore the Singapore court maintains 
its matrimonial jurisdiction theoretically, and the jurisdiction may be revived if the stay 
is lifted for any reason. However, that jurisdiction can no longer exist once a foreign 
status decree is obtained and is recognised in Singapore so that there is no longer a 
marriage for the Singapore court to deal with.  
38 While it is commendable that the Singapore court respects international comity 
in this way in matrimonial proceedings, one side-effect of the application of the natural 
forum doctrine is to increase potentially the size of the problem in the gap in the 
ancillary powers of the Singapore courts. However, there is no good reason to sacrifice 
the natural forum doctrine merely for the sake of regaining the power to grant ancillary 
orders. There is tremendous force in the argument that the forum that is most 
appropriate to hear the matrimonial proceedings should indeed hear the case, and that 
generally such a forum should also hear all ancillary matters relating to the termination 
of the marriage as the court.51 Any problem with the gap in the ancillary powers of the 
Singapore court is rightly a factor in the balance of convenience and justice, and its 
weight depends on the facts of individual cases. Although earlier cases may not have 
                                                 
48 “In any question between husband and wife as to the title to or possession of property, either party may 
apply by summons or otherwise in a summary way to any Judge of the High Court, and the Judge may 
make such order with respect to the property in dispute and as to the costs of and consequent on the 
application as he thinks fit, or may direct the application to stand over, and any inquiry touching the 
matters in question to be made in such manner as he thinks fit”: Guardianship of Infants Act (Cap 122, 
1985 Rev Ed) s 59(1). 
49 PQR (mw) v STR [1993] 1 SLR 574 at 576–577, [6]–[8]. 
50 See, eg, Mala Shukla v Jayant Amritanand Shukla (Danialle An, co-respondent) [2002] 3 SLR 295 and 
Low Wing Hong Alvin v Kelso Sharon Leigh [2001] 1 SLR 173. 
51 Low Wing Hong Alvin v Kelso Sharon Leigh [2001] 1 SLR 173 at [20]–[21]; C v D [2002] SGHC 98 
at [57]. 
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been as clearly alerted to this issue relating to the gap in the ancillary powers of the 
Singapore court,52 more modern authorities have been more sensitive to the restrictive 
effect of foreign orders in Singapore.53 
39 The negative aspect of the natural forum doctrine is that the forum has no 
control over proceedings in foreign countries, short of indirect control through the use 
of the anti-suit injunction to restrain a party personally from continuing with foreign 
proceedings. This remains an exceptional remedy (in the absence of a valid and 
enforceable exclusive choice of forum court agreement)54 in view of the indirect 
interference with the proceedings in foreign courts. The upshot is that one party can 
effectively emasculate the court of the forum of its powers to grant ancillary orders by 
taking proceedings in another jurisdiction to judgment.55 This could turn into an 
unseemly race to be the first to grant the matrimonial judgment.56 
V. Reform 
A. Maintaining current law as an option 
40 The main arguments to maintain the existing legal framework are the policies 
underlying the natural forum doctrine, finality of litigation, and abuse of process. These 
concerns can be observed in the Setiawan case. The court was not sympathetic to W, on 
the basis that W should have asked for her own maintenance in the Indonesian divorce 
proceedings, and enforced the Indonesian maintenance order (in favour of the child) in 
Indonesia itself. The attitude of the court demonstrates the downside of the court of 
forum granting ancillary relief after a foreign matrimonial decree. The court granting 
the matrimonial decree is in most cases best placed to make orders as to such ancillary 
matters, and to enforce such orders. The Singapore court should not allow itself to be 
used as a hub where parties can have a second bite at ancillary relief after obtaining 
their matrimonial decree elsewhere. Neither should the Singapore court be used as an 
appellate process against ancillary orders of foreign courts. 
                                                 
52 See, eg, Low Wing Hong Alvin v Kelso Sharon Leigh [2001] 1 SLR 173 at [21] and Marilyn June Shearer 
v Michael Howard Shearer Divorce Petition 3348/1999 (5 July 2000) (unreported), both apparently 
assuming that a foreign court order dividing matrimonial assets can be given effect to under Singapore 
law. See Debbie Ong & Valerie Thean, “Family Law” (2000) 1 SAL Ann Rev 180 at 181–184. 
53 C v D [2002] SGHC 98 at [61] confining the legal effect in Singapore to foreign orders for the payment of 
money. 
54 Such agreements are rare in the matrimonial context, and may in any event not be enforced by the court. 
For example, agreements between spouses on the division of matrimonial property or maintenance or 
custody do not tie court’s discretion. 
55 Assuming that the decree from the foreign court will be recognised under the private international law of 
Singapore – the rules of recognition are, as noted at paras 18–19, very wide. 
56 See Torok v Torok [1973] 1 WLR 1066. 
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B. Reasons for reform 
41 It could be argued that, as a matter of principle, the recognition that the foreign 
decree has legally changed the status of the parties should put the parties in the same 
position as if the decree had been made by the court of the forum itself, and the parties 
should be entitled to the same social and economic protection of the state. However, 
this argument suffers from the ambiguity inherent in the word “recognition”.57 It could 
mean that the recognising forum acknowledges the change of personal status and 
nothing more, it could mean the recognising forum additionally accords the parties such 
legal rights as if the change had been effected by the court of the forum, or it could 
extend to the recognition of the legal rights of the parties accorded by the law under 
which the decree was granted. 
42 On the other hand, as a matter of policy, there could be legitimate reasons for 
the Singapore court to provide ancillary relief after a foreign matrimonial decree. For 
example, one party may have adequate notice of the foreign divorce proceedings such 
that it would not be possible to invoke the natural justice defence against the 
recognition of the status decree, but proceedings for ancillary relief could have taken 
such a surprising turn that it may be unfair to leave the respondent at the mercy of those 
orders. If the matrimonial assets are substantially in Singapore and the foreign court has 
ordered little by way of maintenance58 in favour of one party because it is ordering 
substantial matrimonial assets to be transferred to that party, then there may be a case 
for the Singapore court to act. If all parties have severed their ties with the foreign 
jurisdiction altogether, and are now residing and holding all assets in Singapore, the 
“natural forum” for ancillary relief (for example, the adjustment of maintenance or 
custody in view of change of circumstances) may have shifted to Singapore. If 
something drastic has occurred in the foreign jurisdiction (revolution, civil unrest, etc) 
rendering it practically impossible for the parties to return to the foreign court for fresh 
ancillary relief or adjustment of ancillary orders, then there may also be a case for 
intervention by the Singapore courts. Further, if one party, through no fault of his or her 
own, has rendered himself/herself unable to seek relief in the foreign court (for 
example, political persecution), then there may be a case for the Singapore court to act. 
Additionally, it may well be that all parties are agreeable to have ancillary matters 
heard in the court of the forum. Moreover, hardship could be caused if the foreign court 
granting the matrimonial decree has very limited powers to deal with ancillary relief.59 
43 Finality of litigation is not as strong a policy consideration in the matrimonial 
context as it is in the commercial context. Indeed, it is generally recognised in the 
matrimonial context that continuing judicial intervention is a matter of course 
especially in view of changes of circumstances. Thus, any perception that the forum is 
                                                 
57 See Willis L M Reese, “The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Draft Convention on the 
Recognition of Foreign Divorces and Legal Separations” (1965) 14 ICLQ 692 at 695–696. 
58 Which may be enforceable in Singapore under the conditions discussed above. 
59 See, eg, Torok v Torok [1973] 1 WLR 1066 (foreign court could not deal with foreign immovable 
matrimonial property (in the forum) and rarely provided for maintenance for the wife). 
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acting as an appellate court over foreign proceedings is an exaggerated one, given that 
in the matrimonial context, finality needs to be weighed against the justice of the case. 
44 Abuse of process, on the other hand, is a real danger that must be guarded 
against if reform is thought necessary. If the foreign court had denied ancillary relief or 
had crafted ancillary relief in a certain way, the reasons should be investigated. The 
foreign decree may also create an issue estoppel in respect of the underlying facts of a 
contested decree. A guiding principle could be that that the foreign decree should 
generally be accorded the same respect as a decree of a local court,60 and an application 
for ancillary relief should be treated on the same basis as if the original decree (and its 
ancillary orders or lack of such orders) had been granted by the local court. 
45 There is a further policy consideration whether the Singapore forum should 
intervene at the risk of being regarded as an “international busybody”,61 or leave it to 
the original foreign court to deal with all the problems arising from its own decree; if 
the foreign court is powerless to act effectively, then so be it.62 However, the hands-off 
attitude of the Singapore courts in commercial cases should not be a reliable guide for 
the matrimonial context. In the former situations, litigation tends to be a one-off affair, 
the losses entirely pecuniary, and commercial entities involved in cross-border 
transactions are generally better able to take care of their economic interests. On the 
other hand, in matrimonial cases, the effects of a matrimonial decree can be long-
lasting and non-pecuniary as well as pecuniary, and may have deleterious effects on the 
substratum of Singapore society if one or more of the parties are connected to 
Singapore. The case for judicial intervention in this context is much stronger. Any 
reform in this area should, however, take into account the concerns expressed above 
regarding the appropriateness of the forum for granting the relief, and guarding against 
the abuse of process. 
46 English judges had recognised the need for power to deal with ancillary matters 
after a foreign matrimonial decree,63 and had referred to the lacuna as a “dangerous gap 
in the existing legislation”,64 a gap which has since been plugged in the law of the 
                                                 
60 Unless there are exceptional reasons, eg, breach of natural justice or contravention of public policy in 
respect of a specific ancillary order. 
61 See the analogous concern of the Singapore court in the non-matrimonial context in People’s Insurance Co 
Ltd v Akai Pty Ltd [1998] 1 SLR 206 at [12]. 
62 See, eg, the analogous attitude of the English court in the non-matrimonial context: Airbus Industrie GIE v 
Patel [1999] 1 AC 119 (forum will not grant anti-suit injunction in aid of litigation in natural forum; it is 
up to the natural forum to deal with such issues). In Singapore, see People’s Insurance Co Ltd v Akai Pty 
Ltd [1998] 1 SLR 206 (the Singapore court will leave it to the contractually chosen forum to protect its 
own proceedings). See also Swift-Fortune Ltd v Magnifica Marine SA [2007] 1 SLR 629 (CA) (suggesting 
that the Singapore court’s asset-preservation orders may be confined to cases where the substantive cause 
of action will be litigated in the forum; so if the litigation is proceeding in the foreign natural forum for the 
main dispute, it is up to that court to deal with – or not – the matter). 
63 Moore v Bull [1891] P 279 at 281–282. 
64 Torok v Torok [1973] 1 WLR 1066 at 1067. 
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United Kingdom.65 There is also international recognition that the question of ancillary 
relief presents a problem in the cross-border effects of matrimonial decrees which 
needs to be addressed.66 It was partly because of the existence of conventions dealing 
with such matters, as well as the fear of introducing complications which might 
prejudice consensus, that the Hague Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and 
Legal Separations67 was not extended to ancillary orders.68 
C. Reform option 1: Expanding scope of powers to grant ancillary relief 
47 A possible model for such reform for Singapore law is to extend the powers 
presently found in the court’s ancillary matrimonial jurisdiction to cases where a 
matrimonial decree has already been obtained in a foreign country and that decree is 
recognised under the private international law of Singapore. Such reform has been 
effected in the United Kingdom, in Part III of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings 
Act 1984 (c 42) (see Annex A),69 and can serve as a useful model for Singapore to 
consider. Academics in Singapore are in favour of reform in this direction.70 Of 
particular note in the United Kingdom legislation are the safeguards to ensure that the 
court of the forum has an interest to act in the case, in addition to the considerations of 
natural forum. Ancillary relief after divorce or nullity is not available as 
comprehensively as under the normal ancillary matrimonial jurisdiction since the court 
cannot make an order unless it is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so, particularly 
having regard to the connections between the former spouses and England, and leave of 
the court to apply for such order is necessary. 
48 One important policy consideration in such reform is the question of the extent 
to which the Singapore court should extend its aid to civil partnerships not amounting 
to what Singapore law recognises as a marriage but which may be accorded a similar 
status as a marriage under foreign legal systems. In the United Kingdom, civil 
                                                 
65 See para 47. 
66 See, eg, Convention on the Law Applicable to Obligations Towards Children (Convention No 8, 
24 October 1956); Convention Concerning the Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions relating to 
Maintenance Obligations Towards Children (Convention No 9, 15 April 1958); Convention on the Law 
Applicable to Maintenance Obligations (Convention No 24, 2 October 1973); Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions relating to Maintenance Obligations (Convention No 23, 
2 October 1973); and Convention on the Recognition and Execution of Decisions Concerning Alimentary 
Obligations Towards Children. 
67 Convention on the Recognition of Divorces and Legal Separations (Convention No 18, 1 June 1970) Art 1. 
68 R H Graveson, K M H Newman, E Anton & D M Edwards, “The Eleventh Session of the Hague 
Conference of Private International Law” (1969) 18 ICLQ 618 at 628. 
69 Following The Law Commission, Financial Relief after Foreign Divorce (Law Com No 117, 1982) and 
Scottish Law Commission, Report on Financial Provision after Foreign Divorce (Scot Law Com No 72, 
1982). 
70 Leong, “Division of Matrimonial Assets: Recent Cases and Thoughts for Reform” (1993) Sing JLS 351 
at 400; Ong, “Financial Relief in Singapore after a Foreign Divorce” (1993) Sing JLS 431. 
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partnerships between parties of the same sex are given similar protection.71 However, 
as Singapore (unlike the United Kingdom) does not protect such relationships within its 
domestic law because such relationships are not regarded as acceptable having regard 
to the fundamental values of the majority in its society, it would not be appropriate to 
extend legal protection to similar foreign relationships.  
49 A different question of policy arises on whether a provision similar to that in the 
English legislation barring remedy to a party who has subsequently formed a civil 
partnership72 should be adopted. On one hand, such a party is practically in the same 
situation as a person who has remarried. On the other hand, one could be accused of 
unfairness in recognising a civil partnership for some purposes (to the detriment of a 
party) but not in others (where the party is claiming the benefit of it). A further 
difficulty is that if the phrase “civil partnership” is to be used in the legislation it ought 
to be defined, and that could be a source of some difficulty since there is no definition 
under domestic Singapore law. One alternative is to refer only to a subsequent 
remarriage, as in the case of the English legislation before amendments were made 
pursuant to changes to United Kingdom law on civil partnerships.73 Subsequent 
formations of civil partnerships or analogous relationships (for example, stable 
cohabitation) could still be taken into account on a case by case basis by the court in 
determining the nature and quantum of the orders to be made. 
50 An important practical advantage of dealing with the problem within an 
expanded ancillary matrimonial jurisdiction of the Singapore court is that the court will 
be dealing with the claims for ancillary relief using familiar principles in the Women’s 
Charter, and subject to the limitations of the Women’s Charter. Thus, the courts will 
not have to deal with unfamiliar claims like maintenance claims by husbands against 
wives, and claims in respect of co-habitants and other forms of civil partnerships. On 
the other hand, the discretionary approach of the courts towards ancillary relief is broad 
enough to take into consideration any relevant foreign connections in the case. For 
example, wielding such a power to divide matrimonial assets, the Singapore court will 
no doubt have regard to any applicable foreign community property regime or foreign 
orders as to the division of matrimonial property in determining what would be a fair 
division of matrimonial property within the effective control of the Singapore court. 
The parties’ expectations during the course of their marriage under a foreign legal 
system should also be taken into account. 
51 Further, such an expanded ancillary jurisdiction will carry a risk of double 
jeopardy, if the Singapore court grants an order on the premise that the foreign court 
order is ineffective, and the applicant manages to find a jurisdiction where both the 
foreign and Singapore orders can be effective. This is, however, not a major problem, 
                                                 
71 Schedule 7 of the UK Civil Partnership Act 2004 (c 33) makes similar provisions for the English court to 
grant ancillary relief after foreign dissolutions of civil partnerships. 
72 Matrimonial and Family Proceedings Act 1984 (c 42) (UK) s 12(2): see Annex A. 
73 Civil Partnership Act 2004 (c 33) (UK) s 261(1), Sched 27, para 90(2), amending Matrimonial and Family 
Proceedings Act 1984 (c 42) (UK) s 12(2) (see Annex A). 
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and can easily be circumvented by making the Singapore order conditional upon an 
undertaking not to enforce the foreign one anywhere. 
D. Reform option 2: Expanding scope of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
relief 
52 One way of reducing the scope of the problem of the lack of power in the 
Singapore court to grant ancillary relief after a foreign matrimonial decree is to increase 
the extent to which the forum will recognise and enforce foreign orders (whether 
originating in the foreign court’s ancillary jurisdiction or otherwise). Orders for the 
payment of money are not difficult to enforce, and there is scope for greater facilitation 
of enforcement of foreign maintenance orders. The legal framework already exists and 
it is a matter of expanding it. 
53 Foreign custody orders raise a more fundamental issue. There is a strong 
argument for the forum to retain ultimate control over questions of custody of children, 
as reflected in the entrenched principle that the welfare of the child is of paramount 
importance. It should be up to the court of the forum to determine for itself what is 
required by the welfare of the child, and care should be taken not to fetter this decision-
making process of the court by rigid rules of recognition. 
54 Where orders to divide matrimonial assets are concerned, the lex situs rule for 
the recognition of foreign in rem judgments is very strongly entrenched and should not 
be disturbed. Property rights are at stake, and third party interests may be affected. 
While it is possible to reform the law to enforce foreign in personam orders to divide 
assets,74 and it might also be possible to circumscribe such reform to orders from courts 
with jurisdictional competence in the matrimonial sense and to restrict it to the context 
of division of matrimonial assets in the aftermath of the break-up of a marriage, the 
recognition of such orders may nevertheless have an in rem effect. Since a local 
judgment ordering the division of matrimonial assets take effect immediately by 
shifting the beneficial interest in the relevant assets situated in Singapore (either 
because the court order actually shifts the interest or because equity deems as done 
what ought to be done),75 it is arguable that a foreign judgment ordering the same, once 
recognised as binding and effective under Singapore law, will have the same effect. If 
so, any step in this direction should be taken with considerable caution. 
55 In any event, this mode of law reform can only be a partial solution at best, 
because it does not address the situations where the foreign court which granted the 
matrimonial order had made no orders for ancillary relief. 
                                                 
74  The common law of Canada is moving towards the enforcement of non-money judgments: see Pro Swing 
Inc v Elta Golf Inc [2006] 2 SCR 612; 2006 SCC 52. 
75 Similar to an order for the specific performance of a contract to transfer property with nothing left to be 
done under the contract. In respect of court orders to transfer matrimonial assets, see Salijah bte Ab Latef v 
Mohd Irwan bin Abdullah Teo [1996] 2 SLR 201 (CA) at [101]–[106]. 
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E. Reform option 3: Expanding scope of independent powers in respect of 
ancillary relief 
56 Another method of narrowing the gap caused by the inability of the Singapore 
court to order ancillary relief after a foreign matrimonial decree is to expand the scope 
of the powers of the court to make similar orders which are not ancillary to the 
matrimonial jurisdiction. However, expanding the independent powers is a general step 
and there will be wide-ranging implications for domestic as well as cross-border cases 
in respect of each power that is expanded. This method is a very blunt instrument to 
deal with the present problem of the aftermath of marital break-up, whenever that 
marriage may have been judicially declared to be ended. 
VI. Recommendations 
57 In summary, there is clearly a gap in Singapore law in the lack of judicial power 
to grant ancillary relief upon the recognition of a foreign matrimonial decree under its 
private international law. The size of this problem depends partly on the practical 
consideration of the likelihood of incidents where a marriage is terminated in a foreign 
country and this has cross-border effects and at least some of the aftermath is felt in 
Singapore. Given the globalisation trends in this country and elsewhere, particularly in 
the region, the cross-border effects of marital break-ups look set to increase. The size of 
the problem also depends on the legal considerations of: 
(a) the scope of the rules of recognition of foreign decrees; 
(b) the extent to which foreign orders relating to the break-up of marriages 
will be recognised and enforced in Singapore;  
(c) the extent to which the Singapore court has independent powers to deal 
with such matters; and  
(d) the extent to which the Singapore court will give effect to the principle 
of natural forum in matrimonial cases.  
58 We have demonstrated that the gap problem is acute only when there is reliance 
on the matrimonial jurisdiction which predicates a subsisting marriage for its subject 
matter, namely when the petitioner relies on the maintenance jurisdiction and the 
property division jurisdiction of the Women’s Charter. We suggest that the best mode 
of reform is to deal with the problem directly and to expand ancillary matrimonial 
jurisdiction of the court, along the lines of the law reform effect in the United Kingdom 
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(Annex A). The proposed draft provisions can be found at Annex B.76 This would also 
remove a present anomaly in the application of the reciprocal enforcement of 
maintenance orders schemes in Singapore which arises in that an ancillary maintenance 
order made in England in respect of a foreign divorce is registrable and enforceable in 
Singapore but there is at present no question of an equivalent order being made in 
Singapore and being transmitted for registration and enforcement in England. 
59 We do not for the time being suggest that the court should also be empowered 
to intervene where foreign ancillary maintenance orders have been made. Whether 
these orders should be enforced with or without variation will continue to depend on 
the application of the reciprocal enforcement legislation or the common law. Nor do we 
for the time being suggest that the jurisdiction to grant ancillary relief after divorce or 
nullity should be extended to cover compensation for loss of succession rights or rights 
to the other spouse’s pension or assignments of life insurance or capital redemption 
policies or purchased life annuities. Such matters therefore cannot under our suggestion 
be raised as independent grounds for ancillary relief but can perhaps be taken into 
account by the court exercising the jurisdiction to grant an ancillary property division 
order. 
60 With respect to property distribution or division, there is necessarily a gap 
problem even where a foreign ancillary property order has been made if the subject 
matter is properly characterised as immovable property situated in Singapore. Our 
recommendations ensure that a former spouse will be able to enjoy the benefits of 
section 112 of the Women’s Charter provided of course that the conditions for ancillary 
relief which we have recommended are met. 
61 We have noted above the necessity of guarding this proposed expansion of the 
powers of the Singapore courts against abuse of process. We propose three levels of 
safeguards along the lines of the law in the United Kingdom. The applicant should have 
to satisfy the court that: 
(a) the parties have a genuine connection with Singapore, and 
(b) there are substantial grounds upon which the court could be asked to 
exercise its new powers, in order to obtain leave to commence 
proceedings; 
and when these jurisdictional requirements are satisfied, 
(c) the court must be satisfied that Singapore is the appropriate venue before 
it makes the ancillary orders for financial relief. 
                                                 
76 The sub-committee gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Attorney-General’s Chambers of 
Singapore in the drafting of the Bill. 
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62 We are of the view that there is sufficient connection between the parties and 
Singapore if either of the parties to the marriage was domiciled in Singapore at the date 
of application for leave or the date on which the foreign change of status took effect, or 
if either of the parties have been habitually resident in Singapore for one year before 
the date of such application or the date the foreign change of status took effect. On the 
other hand, the connection based on the mere existence of a prior matrimonial home in 
which either party maintains beneficial interest under the United Kingdom model 
(section 15(1)(c)) is thought to be too tenuous a connection for the Singapore court to 
assume jurisdiction where the parties have otherwise no other connection with 
Singapore, even if the resulting orders are only in relation to that property. 
63 We recommend that the applicant should have to establish substantial ground 
for the making of the financial relief in order to obtain leave to commence proceedings. 
The purpose of this requirement is to allow the court to assess the applicant’s prospects 
of success. This requirement at the jurisdictional stage has proven in practice to be 
useful in sieving out unmeritorious applications in the United Kingdom.77 
64 We recommend that the court should dismiss the application if, in spite of the 
connections of the parties to the marriage with Singapore, Singapore is not the 
appropriate venue for making the orders. Guidelines for the determination of this point 
are provided in clause 121F(2) of the proposed draft bill. These factors are consistent 
with the doctrine of natural forum. 
65 Application for leave of court that is required to commence proceedings must 
necessarily be ex parte in nature. We are mindful that the procedure ought to be fair to 
both parties on the one hand, and should be as expeditious as possible on the other. 
Even at the commencement of the proceedings, the applicant should have to set out 
fully all the facts and matters relied upon in support of the application for relief, in 
order to establish that there are substantial grounds of relief. The ex parte leave 
application should entail the usual requirement of full and frank disclosure of all 
                                                 
77 The case law has repeatedly emphasised that the expanded powers of the court were not intended to 
provide an ex-spouse with “a second bite of the cherry”. For eg, leave was refused in Holmes v Holmes 
[1989] Fam 47 (CA) on the ground that the applicant’s dissatisfaction with the ancillary relief orders of the 
New York court which had examined the relevant issues and was the natural forum for the dispute did not 
amount to any substantial ground; leave was denied in M v M (financial provision after foreign divorce) 
[1994] 1 FLR 399, among other reasons, because the applicant was seen to be attempting to re-litigate 
issues fully ventilated in the French court; and in Jordan v Jordan [2000] 1 WLR 210 (CA) it was held that 
leave should not have been given where the California court was the primary jurisdiction to grant and 
enforce the ancillary orders and there were insufficient connections between the parties and England. On 
the other hand, “substantial ground” does not require the applicant to prove hardship and injustice: Jordan 
v Jordan [2000] 1 WLR 210 (CA). In contrast, leave was granted in A v S (Financial relief after overseas 
US divorce and financial proceedings) [2002] EWHC 1157 (Fam), [2003] 1 FLR 431 where the English 
court thought there was an issue of the wife allegedly relying on the husband having made a promise or 
statement of intention which was not ventilated in the foreign court; in M v L (Financial relief after 
overseas divorce) [2003] EWHC 328 (Fam), [2003] 2 FLR 425, leave was thought appropriate because the 
issue of maintenance (in contrast to property division) had not been addressed by the foreign court 
decreeing the divorce. 
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relevant matter. We also recommend that in granting leave the court should be able to 
impose conditions. 
66 We propose that once leave is granted, the hearing should generally move on to 
the inter partes substantive hearing, where the court will determine, on the evidence 
from both parties (assuming the application is contested): (a) whether Singapore is the 
appropriate forum for granting the relief sought; and if so, (b) what orders are 
appropriate on the facts. In contrast, at the ex parte stage, only the evidence of the 
applicant is available, and the key question is the prospect of succeeding at the 
inter partes stage (“substantial ground for the making of an application”78). Since the 
applicant’s success at the inter partes stage depends on both natural forum 
considerations as well as the merits of the case, both must therefore be relevant at the 
ex parte stage during the application for leave, though the burden at the ex parte stage 
must necessarily be lower. This provides a way for the system to filter out potential 
abuses of the expanded powers of the court. 
67 At first blush, this procedure may sound counter-intuitive because it may be 
thought that ordinarily a successful ex parte application for leave to commence 
proceedings should potentially be followed by a challenge to the leave on the same 
grounds on which the leave was granted. We would, however, restrict the challenge at 
this stage to jurisdictional grounds (ie, the connections of the parties to the marriage to 
Singapore required under clause 121C of the proposed draft bill). This type of 
challenge should be allowed because the jurisdiction of the court goes to the root of the 
claim. Further, this challenge is based on well-established principles of law and not 
subject to discretionary considerations. To go further to allow challenges based on 
prospects of success or natural forum considerations before getting to the substantive 
hearing itself will, we fear, increase the cost and complexity of the process and prolong 
the proceedings.79 At present, we do not think that the clear procedural division in civil 
and matrimonial proceedings between establishing jurisdiction through nexus and 
exercise of jurisdiction on one hand and the merits of the claim on the other is 
necessarily a good thing in this expanded jurisdiction of the court. 
68 In summary, the procedure we recommend is this. The plaintiff commences 
proceedings by filing an originating summons and takes out an ex parte application by 
way of summons in chambers for an order for financial relief. In the affidavit in support 
of the ex parte application, the plaintiff needs to show that: 
                                                 
78 Clause 121D(1) of the proposed draft bill. 
79 A similar concern was expressed in Jordan v Jordan [2000] 1 WLR 210 (CA) at 222 in the context of the 
corresponding English procedure. An analogy was drawn from judicial review cases where once ex parte 
leave is granted, attempts to discharge leave inter partes is strongly discouraged. 
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(a) the jurisdictional connections under 121B are satisfied; 
(b) there are substantial grounds for commencing the proceedings and 
making the application; and 
(c) Singapore is the appropriate venue. 
If ex parte leave is not granted, the usual avenue(s) of appeal should be available. If 
ex parte leave is granted, and process is served on the defendant, the defendant may 
challenge the leave only on the first ground, without prejudice to the right to challenge 
on the other grounds. The usual rules relating to the onus on a party making an ex parte 
application would apply. The usual avenue(s) of appeal should also be available at this 
stage. If there is no challenge (in which case the defendant should be taken to have 
submitted to the jurisdiction and to be thereby estopped from challenging the 
jurisdiction of the court) or the challenge fails, then the matter proceeds for an 
adjudication on the second and third questions. Parties will attend before the court for 
directions on the filing of affidavits relating to the second and third questions, and 
thereafter, the court will hear arguments inter partes on the second and third questions, 
and dispose of the matter accordingly. Once again, the usual avenue(s) of appeal should 
be available. 
69 We recommend no change to the current law that dissolution of Muslim 
marriages should fall within the domain of the Syariah courts. We do not make any 
recommendations in respect of, and our recommendations do not affect, the law and 
practice of the Syariah courts in Singapore. Presently, the civil courts in Singapore have 
concurrent jurisdiction with the Syariah Court in respect of ancillary orders after 
divorce or annulment of Muslim marriages.80 In domestic law practice, the Syariah 
courts deals with practically all ancillary matters after divorce, and the concurrent 
jurisdiction of the civil court is mostly invoked to enforce orders made by the Syariah 
Court. Under the Administration of Muslim Law Act,81 there is no division of primary 
and ancillary jurisdiction when it comes to ancillary matters after dissolution of a 
marriage,82 so it does not appear to have its hands tied like the civil courts after it 
recognises a foreign divorce. Where the Syariah Court makes such orders, there is no 
problem with the Family Court lending its usual assistance in their enforcement. We 
have therefore excluded matters falling within the Syariah jurisdiction from our 
proposals. 
70 The United Kingdom legislation which we recommend as a model applies in 
cases where a divorce is obtained in “judicial and other proceedings” in a foreign 
                                                 
80 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 1999 Rev Ed) s 17A(2). 
81 Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 1999 Rev Ed). 
82 Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 1999 Rev Ed) s 35. 
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country. The legislative regime for family law in the United Kingdom distinguishes 
three types of divorces: 
(a) the divorce obtained in judicial proceedings which is the western norm; 
(b) the divorce obtained by taking extra-judicial steps and not involving any 
legal proceedings at all (for example, the talak in many countries which 
recognise it); and 
(c) the divorce obtained by taking extra-judicial steps which involves some 
legal proceedings, but which proceedings involve no investigation or 
determination (the Jewish ghet, Muslim talak, and other types of 
administrative divorces in some countries). 
Under the Family Law Act 1986, broad statutory grounds83 for the recognition of 
foreign divorces obtained in “judicial or other proceedings” apply to heads (a) and (b) 
above but narrower grounds (more restrictive than the common law)84 apply to head (c) 
above. It is easy to understand the reluctance of the United Kingdom parliament to 
extend the broad grounds of recognition to divorces not obtained through judicial 
proceedings, but it is less easy to understand why they distinguished between heads (b) 
and (c) above. It follows from the application of narrower recognition grounds to (c) 
that there is wider scope for the court to assume matrimonial jurisdiction in such cases, 
and therefore there is a comparatively lesser need for the expanded ancillary 
jurisdiction to apply in such cases. It is, however, to be noted that the Law Commission 
which authored the report leading to the 1986 legislation had actually recommended 
that “other proceedings” should also encompass acts of divorce which are done in and 
recognised by the law of that country,85 but this recommendation had not been followed 
in parliament or subsequent case law. It is understandable that there should be 
consistency within the broader family law regime within the United Kingdom on the 
meaning of the phrase “judicial and other proceedings”. 
71 Under Singapore law, the common law applies to the issue of recognition of 
foreign non-judicial divorces and other changes to matrimonial status.86 Since non-
                                                 
83 The decree obtained in a foreign country will be recognised if at the date of the commencement of the 
proceedings, either party to the marriage was habitually resident or domiciled or was a national in that 
country: Family Law Act 1986 (c 55) (UK) s 46(1). 
84 An extra-judicial divorce (or annulment or legal separation) obtained in a foreign country and valid under 
its law will be recognised if at the date it was obtained one party to the marriage was domiciled in that 
country and the other party was domiciled in that country or domiciled in a country whose law recognised 
the divorce (etc), provided that neither party had been habitually resident in the UK for one year 
immediately before that date: Family Law Act 1986 (c 55) (UK) s 46(2). 
85 Private International Law: Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees (SLC88) (Cmnd 9347, 1984) at 122, 
cl 12(1) of the draft bill. 
86 The Women’s Charter constrains non-Muslims within its scope of application to have recourse to judicial 
proceedings for divorce if they want to divorce in Singapore. While it is not clear to what extent it prevents 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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judicial changes to matrimonial status are recognised on the same status theory as 
judicial divorces,87 the rules of recognition are presumably the same. Omission of 
Muslim marriages and consequently the talak from our proposal will not be a problem 
because the Syariah Court can assume jurisdiction anyway (and its orders can be 
enforced with the usual assistance of the Family Court). However, as Islamic law is not 
the only system of personal law that recognises extra-judicial divorces, it is thought that 
the proposal should extend to non-Muslim extra-judicial divorces, and that there is no 
benefit in trying to distinguish between such divorces which involve some proceedings 
and those which do not involve any proceedings. We do not make any 
recommendations on, and our recommendations do not affect, the recognition rules for 
non-judicial divorces or other changes to matrimonial status; our recommendations 
only affect the consequences for the ancillary relief jurisdiction of the Singapore court 
if and when such a divorce or other change to matrimonial status is recognised. 
                                                                                                                      
foreign non-Muslim domiciliaries from invoking non-judicial divorce in Singapore (see Tan Yock Lin, 
Conflicts Issues in Family and Succession Law (Butterworths Asia, 1993) at p 399), it does not prevent the 
issue of the recognition of non-judicial divorces taking place in foreign countries from arising. 
87 Qureshi v Qureshi [1972] Fam 173 at 199; Dicey, Morris and Collins: The Conflict of Laws (L Collins 
et al eds) (14th Ed, 2006) at para 18-095. 
 A-1 
 
 
 
ANNEX A: 
 
MATRIMONIAL AND FAMILY PROCEEDINGS 
ACT 1984 (C 42) (UK) 
 
PART III 
Report of the Law Reform Committee on Ancillary Orders after Foreign Divorce or Annulment 
A-2 
Financial Relief in England and Wales after Overseas Divorce etc 
Applications for Financial Relief 
12 Applications for financial relief after overseas divorce etc 
(1) Where— 
(a) a marriage has been dissolved or annulled, or the parties to a marriage 
have been legally separated, by means of judicial or other proceedings in 
an overseas country, and 
(b) the divorce, annulment or legal separation is entitled to be recognised as 
valid in England and Wales, 
either party to the marriage may apply to the court in the manner prescribed by rules of 
court for an order for financial relief under this Part of this Act. 
(2) If after a marriage has been dissolved or annulled in an overseas country one of 
the parties to the marriage forms a subsequent marriage or civil partnership, that party 
shall not be entitled to make an application in relation to that marriage. 
(3) The reference in subsection (2) above to the forming of a subsequent marriage 
or civil partnership includes a reference to the forming of a marriage or civil 
partnership which is by law void or voidable. 
(4) In this Part of this Act except sections 19, 23, and 24 “order for financial relief” 
means an order under section 17 or 22 below of a description referred to in that section. 
13 Leave of the court required for applications for financial relief 
(1) No application for an order for financial relief shall be made under this Part of 
this Act unless the leave of the court has been obtained in accordance with rules of 
court; and the court shall not grant leave unless it considers that there is substantial 
ground for the making of an application for such an order. 
(2) The court may grant leave under this section notwithstanding that an order has 
been made by a court in a country outside England and Wales requiring the other party 
to the marriage to make any payment or transfer any property to the applicant or a child 
of the family. 
(3) Leave under this section may be granted subject to such conditions as the court 
thinks fit. 
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14 Interim orders for maintenance 
(1) Where leave is granted under section 13 above for the making of an application 
for an order for financial relief and it appears to the court that the applicant or any child 
of the family is in immediate need of financial assistance, the court may make an 
interim order for maintenance, that is to say, an order requiring the other party to the 
marriage to make to the applicant or to the child such periodical payments, and for such 
term, being a term beginning not earlier than the date of the grant of leave and ending 
with the date of the determination of the application for an order for financial relief, as 
the court thinks reasonable. 
(2) If it appears to the court that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the 
application for an order for financial relief by reason only of paragraph (c) of 
section 15(1) below the court shall not make an interim order under this section. 
(3) An interim order under subsection (1) above may be made subject to such 
conditions as the court thinks fit. 
15 Jurisdiction of the court 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, the court shall have jurisdiction to entertain an 
application for an order for financial relief if any of the following jurisdictional 
requirements are satisfied, that is to say— 
(a) either of the parties to the marriage was domiciled in England and Wales 
on the date of the application for leave under section 13 above or was so 
domiciled on the date on which the divorce, annulment or legal 
separation obtained in the overseas country took effect in that country; 
or 
(b) either of the parties to the marriage was habitually resident in England 
and Wales throughout the period of one year ending with the date of the 
application for leave or was so resident throughout the period of one 
year ending with the date on which the divorce, annulment or legal 
separation obtained in the overseas country took effect in that country; 
or 
(c) either or both of the parties to the marriage had at the date of the 
application for leave a beneficial interest in possession in a dwelling-
house situated in England or Wales which was at some time during the 
marriage a matrimonial home of the parties to the marriage. 
(2) Where the jurisdiction of the court to entertain proceedings under this Part of 
this Act would fall to be determined by reference to the jurisdictional requirements 
imposed by virtue of Part I of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 
(implementation of certain European conventions) or by virtue of Council Regulation 
(EC) No. 44/2001 of 22nd December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters or then— 
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(a) satisfaction of the requirements of subsection (1) above shall not obviate 
the need to satisfy the requirements imposed by virtue of that Regulation 
or Part I of that Act; and 
(b) satisfaction of the requirements imposed by virtue of that Regulation or 
Part I of that Act shall obviate the need to satisfy the requirements of 
subsection (1) above; 
and the court shall entertain or not entertain the proceedings accordingly. 
16 Duty of the court to consider whether England and Wales is appropriate 
venue for application 
(1) Before making an order for financial relief the court shall consider whether in 
all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for such an order to be made 
by a court in England and Wales, and if the court is not satisfied that it would be 
appropriate, the court shall dismiss the application. 
(2) The court shall in particular have regard to the following matters— 
(a) the connection which the parties to the marriage have with England and 
Wales; 
(b) the connection which those parties have with the country in which the 
marriage was dissolved or annulled or in which they were legally 
separated; 
(c) the connection which those parties have with any other country outside 
England and Wales; 
(d) any financial benefit which the applicant or a child of the family has 
received, or is likely to receive, in consequence of the divorce, 
annulment or legal separation, by virtue of any agreement or the 
operation of the law of a country outside England and Wales; 
(e) in a case where an order has been made by a court in a country outside 
England and Wales requiring the other party to the marriage to make any 
payment or transfer any property for the benefit of the applicant or a 
child of the family, the financial relief given by the order and the extent 
to which the order has been complied with or is likely to be complied 
with; 
(f) any right which the applicant has, or has had, to apply for financial relief 
from the other party to the marriage under the law of any country 
outside England and Wales and if the applicant has omitted to exercise 
that right the reason for that omission; 
(g) the availability in England and Wales of any property in respect of 
which an order under this Part of this Act in favour of the applicant 
could be made; 
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(h) the extent to which any order made under this Part of this Act is likely to 
be enforceable; 
(i) the length of time which has elapsed since the date of the divorce, 
annulment or legal separation. 
Orders for financial provision and property adjustment 
17 Orders for financial provision and property adjustment 
(1) Subject to section 20 below, on an application by a party to a marriage for an 
order for financial relief under this section, the court may— 
(a) make any one or more of the orders which it could make under Part II of 
the 1973 Act if a decree of divorce, a decree of nullity of marriage or a 
decree of judicial separation in respect of the marriage had been granted 
in England and Wales, that is to say— 
(i) any order mentioned in section 23(1) of the 1973 Act (financial 
provision orders); and 
(ii) any order mentioned in section 24(1) of that Act (property 
adjustment orders); and 
(b) if the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, make one or more orders 
each of which would, within the meaning of that Part of that Act, be a 
pension sharing order in relation to the marriage. 
(2) Subject to section 20 below, where the court makes a secured periodical 
payments order, an order for the payment of a lump sum or a property adjustment order 
under subsection (1) above, then, on making that order or at any time thereafter, the 
court may make any order mentioned in section 24A(1) of the 1973 Act (orders for sale 
of property) which the court would have power to make if the order under 
subsection (1) above had been made under Part II of the 1973 Act. 
18 Matters to which the court is to have regard in exercising its powers under s 17 
(1) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 17 above and, if so, in 
what manner the court shall act in accordance with this section. 
(2) The court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first 
consideration being given to the welfare while a minor of any child of the family who 
has not attained the age of eighteen. 
(3) As regards the exercise of those powers in relation to a party to the marriage, 
the court shall in particular have regard to the matters mentioned in section 25(2)(a) to 
(h) of the 1973 Act and shall be under duties corresponding with those imposed by 
section 25A(1) and (2) of the 1973 Act where it decides to exercise under section 17 
above powers corresponding with the powers referred to in those subsections. 
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(3A) The matters to which the court is to have regard under subsection (3) above— 
(a) so far as relating to paragraph (a) of section 25(2) of the 1973 Act, 
include any benefits under a pension arrangement which a party to the 
marriage has or is likely to have (whether or not in the foreseeable 
future), and 
(b) so far as relating to paragraph (h) of that provision, include any benefits 
under a pension arrangement which, by reason of the dissolution or 
annulment of the marriage, a party to the marriage will lose the chance 
of acquiring. 
(4) As regards the exercise of those powers in relation to a child of the family, the 
court shall in particular have regard to the matters mentioned in section 25(3)(a) to (e) 
of the 1973 Act. 
(5) As regards the exercise of those powers against a party to the marriage in favour 
of a child of the family who is not the child of that party, the court shall also have 
regard to the matters mentioned in section 25(4)(a) to (c) of the 1973 Act. 
(6) Where an order has been made by a court outside England and Wales for the 
making of payments or the transfer of property by a party to the marriage, the court in 
considering in accordance with this section the financial resources of the other party to 
the marriage or a child of the family shall have regard to the extent to which that order 
has been complied with or is likely to be complied with. 
(7) In this section— 
(a) “pension arrangement” has the meaning given by section 25D(3) of the 
1973 Act, and 
(b) references to benefits under a pension arrangement include any benefits 
by way of pension, whether under a pension arrangement or not. 
19 Consent orders for financial provision or property adjustment 
(1) Notwithstanding anything in section 18 above, on an application for a consent 
order for financial relief the court may, unless it has reason to think that there are other 
circumstances into which it ought to inquire, make an order in the terms agreed on the 
basis only of the prescribed information furnished with the application. 
(2) Subsection (1) above applies to an application for a consent order varying or 
discharging an order for financial relief as it applies to an application for an order for 
financial relief.  
(3) In this section— 
“consent order”, in relation to an application for an order, means an order in the 
terms applied for to which the respondent agrees; 
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“order for financial relief” means an order under section 17 above; and 
“prescribed” means prescribed by rules of court. 
20 Restriction of powers of court where jurisdiction depends on matrimonial 
home in England or Wales 
(1) Where the court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order for 
financial relief by reason only of the situation in England and Wales of a dwelling-
house which was a matrimonial home of the parties, the court may make under 
section 17 above any one or more of the following orders (but no other)— 
(a) an order that either party to the marriage shall pay to the other such lump 
sum as may be specified in the order; 
(b) an order that a party to the marriage shall pay to such person as may be 
so specified for the benefit of a child of the family, or to such a child, 
such lump sum as may be so specified; 
(c) an order that a party to the marriage shall transfer to the other party, to 
any child of the family or to such person as may be so specified for the 
benefit of such a child, the interest of the first-mentioned party in the 
dwelling-house, or such part of that interest as may be so specified; 
(d) an order that a settlement of the interest of a party to the marriage in the 
dwelling-house, or such part of that interest as may be so specified, be 
made to the satisfaction of the court for the benefit of the other party to 
the marriage and of the children of the family or either or any of them; 
(e) an order varying for the benefit of the parties to the marriage and of the 
children of the family or either or any of them any ante-nuptial or post-
nuptial settlement (including such a settlement made by will or codicil) 
made on the parties to the marriage so far as that settlement relates to an 
interest in the dwelling-house; 
(f) an order extinguishing or reducing the interest of either of the parties to 
the marriage under any such settlement so far as that interest is an 
interest in the dwelling-house; 
(g) an order for the sale of the interest of a party to the marriage in the 
dwelling-house. 
(2) Where, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (1) above, the court makes 
an order for the payment of a lump sum by a party to the marriage, the amount of the 
lump sum shall not exceed, or where more than one such order is made the total amount 
of the lump sums shall not exceed in aggregate, the following amount, that is to say— 
(a) if the interest of that party in the dwelling-house is sold in pursuance of 
an order made under subsection (1)(g) above, the amount of the 
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proceeds of the sale of that interest after deducting therefrom any costs 
incurred in the sale thereof; 
(b) if the interest of that party is not so sold, the amount which in the 
opinion of the court represents the value of that interest. 
(3) Where the interest of a party to the marriage in the dwelling-house is held 
jointly or in common with any other person or persons— 
(a) the reference in subsection (1)(g) above to the interest of a party to the 
marriage shall be construed as including a reference to the interest of 
that other person, or the interest of those other persons, in the dwelling-
house, and 
(b) the reference in subsection (2)(a) above to the amount of the proceeds of 
a sale ordered under subsection (1)(g) above shall be construed as a 
reference to that part of those proceeds which is attributable to the 
interest of that party to the marriage in the dwelling-house. 
21 Application to orders under ss 14 and 17 of certain provisions of Part II of 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 
(1) The following provisions of Part II of the 1973 Act (financial relief for parties 
to marriage and children of family) shall apply in relation to an order under section 14 
or 17 above as they apply in relation to a like order under that Part of that Act, that is to 
say–  
(a) section 23(3)(provisions as to lump sums); 
(b) section 24A(2), (4), (5) and (6) (provisions as to orders for sale); 
(ba) section 24B(3) to (5) (provisions about pension sharing orders in relation 
to divorce and nullity); 
(bb) section 24C (duty to stay pension sharing orders); 
(bc) section 24D (apportionment of pension sharing charges); 
(bd) section 25B(3) to (7B) (power, by financial provision order, to attach 
payments under a pension arrangement, or to require the exercise of a 
right of commutation under such an arrangement); 
(be) section 25C (extension of lump sum powers in relation to death benefits 
under a pension arrangement); 
(c) section 28(1) and (2) (duration of continuing financial provision orders 
in favour of party to marriage); 
(d) section 29 (duration of continuing financial provision orders in favour of 
children, and age limit on making certain orders in their favour); 
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(e) section 30 (direction for settlement of instrument for securing payments 
or effecting property adjustment), except paragraph (b); 
(f) section 31 (variation, discharge etc of certain orders for financial relief), 
except subsection (2)(e) and subsection (4); 
(g) section 32 (payment of certain arrears unenforceable without the leave 
of the court); 
(h) section 33 (orders for repayment of sums paid under certain orders); 
(i) section 38 (orders for repayment of sums paid after cessation of order by 
reason of remarriage); 
(j) section 39 (settlements etc. made in compliance with a property 
adjustment order may be avoided on bankruptcy of settlor); and 
(k) section 40 (payments etc under order made in favour of person suffering 
from mental disorder). 
(l) section 40A (appeals relating to pension sharing orders which have 
taken effect). 
(2) Subsection (1)(bd) and (be) above shall not apply where the court has 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for an order for financial relief by reason only of 
the situation in England or Wales of a dwelling-house which was a matrimonial home 
of the parties.  
(3) Section 25D(1) of the 1973 Act (effect of transfers on orders relating to rights 
under a pension arrangement) shall apply in relation to an order made under section 17 
above by virtue of subsection (1)(bd) or (be) above as it applies in relation to an order 
made under section 23 of that Act by virtue of section 25B or 25C of the 1973 Act. 
(4) The Lord Chancellor may by regulations make for the purposes of this Part of 
this Act provision corresponding to any provision which may be made by him under 
subsections (2) to (2B) of section 25D of the 1973 Act.  
(5) Power to make regulations under this section shall be exercisable by statutory 
instrument which shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either 
House of Parliament. 
Orders for transfer of tenancies 
22 Powers of court in relation to certain tenancies of dwelling-houses 
(1) This section applies if— 
(a) an application is made by a party to a marriage for an order for financial 
relief; and 
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(b) one of the parties is entitled, either in his own right or jointly with the 
other party, to occupy a dwelling-house situated in England or Wales by 
virtue of a tenancy which is a relevant tenancy within the meaning of 
Schedule 7 to the Family Law Act 1996 (certain statutory tenancies). 
(2) The court may make in relation to that dwelling-house any order which it could 
make under Part II of that Schedule if— 
(a) a divorce order, 
(b) a separation order, or 
(c) a decree of nullity of marriage, 
had been made or granted in England and Wales in respect of the marriage. 
(3) The provisions of paragraphs 10, 11 and 14(1) in Part III of that Schedule apply 
in relation to any order under this section as they apply to any order under Part II of that 
Schedule. 
Avoidance of transactions intended to prevent or reduce financial relief 
23 Avoidance of transactions intended to defeat applications for financial 
relief 
(1) For the purposes of this section “financial relief” means relief under section 14 
or 17 above and any reference to defeating a claim by a party to a marriage for financial 
relief is a reference to preventing financial relief from being granted or reducing the 
amount of relief which might be granted, or frustrating or impeding the enforcement of 
any order which might be or has been made under either of those provisions at the 
instance of that party. 
(2) Where leave is granted under section 13 above for the making by a party to a 
marriage of an application for an order for financial relief under section 17 above, the 
court may, on an application by that party— 
(a) if it is satisfied that the other party to the marriage is, with the intention 
of defeating the claim for financial relief, about to make any disposition 
or to transfer out of the jurisdiction or otherwise deal with any property, 
make such order as it thinks fit for restraining the other party from so 
doing or otherwise for protecting the claim; 
(b) if it is satisfied that the other party has, with that intention, made a 
reviewable disposition and that if the disposition were set aside financial 
relief or different financial relief would be granted to the applicant, 
make an order setting aside the disposition. 
(3) Where an order for financial relief under section 14 or 17 above has been made 
by the court at the instance of a party to a marriage, then, on an application made by 
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that party, the court may, if it is satisfied that the other party to the marriage has, with 
the intention of defeating the claim for financial relief, made a reviewable disposition, 
make an order setting aside the disposition.  
(4) Where the court has jurisdiction to entertain the application for an order for 
financial relief by reason only of paragraph (c) of section 15(1) above, it shall not make 
any order under subsection (2) or (3) above in respect of any property other than the 
dwelling-house concerned.  
(5) Where the court makes an order under subsection (2)(b) or (3) above setting 
aside a disposition it shall give such consequential directions as it thinks fit for giving 
effect to the order (including directions requiring the making of any payments or the 
disposal of any property).  
(6) Any disposition made by the other party to the marriage (whether before or after 
the commencement of the application) is a reviewable disposition for the purposes of 
subsections (2)(b) and (3) above unless it was made for valuable consideration (other 
than marriage) to a person who, at the time of the disposition, acted in relation to it in 
good faith and without notice of any intention on the part of the other party to defeat 
the applicant’s claim for financial relief.  
(7) Where an application is made under subsection (2) or (3) above with respect to 
a disposition which took place less than three years before the date of the application or 
with respect to a disposition or other dealing with property which is about to take place 
and the court is satisfied— 
(a) in a case falling within subsection (2)(a) or (b) above, that the 
disposition or other dealing would (apart from this section) have the 
consequence, or 
(b) in a case falling within subsection (3) above, that the disposition has had 
the consequence, 
of defeating a claim by the applicant for financial relief, it shall be presumed, unless the 
contrary is shown, that the person who disposed of or is about to dispose of or deal with 
the property did so or, as the case may be, is about to do so, with the intention of 
defeating the applicant’s claim for financial relief. 
(8) In this section “disposition” does not include any provision contained in a will 
or codicil but, with that exception, includes any conveyance, assurance or gift of 
property of any description, whether made by an instrument or otherwise. 
(9) The preceding provisions of this section are without prejudice to any power of 
the High Court to grant injunctions under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
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24 Prevention of transactions intended to defeat prospective applications for 
financial relief 
(1) Where, on an application by a party to a marriage, it appears to the court— 
(a) that the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, or that the parties to 
the marriage have been legally separated, by means of judicial or other 
proceedings in an overseas country; and 
(b) that the applicant intends to apply for leave to make an application for 
an order for financial relief under section 17 above as soon as he or she 
has been habitually resident in England and Wales for a period of one 
year; and 
(c) that the other party to the marriage is, with the intention of defeating a 
claim for financial relief, about to make any disposition or to transfer out 
of the jurisdiction or otherwise deal with any property, 
the court may make such order as it thinks fit for restraining the other party from taking 
such action as is mentioned in paragraph (c) above.  
(2) For the purposes of an application under subsection (1) above— 
(a) the reference to defeating a claim for financial relief shall be construed 
in accordance with subsection (1) of section 23 above (omitting the 
reference to any order which has been made); and 
(b) subsections (7) and (8) of section 23 above shall apply as they apply for 
the purposes of an application under that section. 
(3) The preceding provisions of this section are without prejudice to any power of 
the High Court to grant injunctions under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
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Women’s Charter (Amendment) Bill 
Bill No. 00/2009. 
Read the first time on ……………20xx. 
A BILL 
i n t i t u l e d 
An Act to amend the Women’s Charter (Chapter 353 of the 1985 Revised Edition). 
Be it enacted by the President with the advice and consent of the Parliament of 
Singapore, as follows: 
Short title and commencement 
1. This Act may be cited as the Women’s Charter (Amendment) Act 2008 and 
shall come into operation on such date as the Minister may, by notification in the 
Gazette, appoint. 
New Chapter 4A 
2. The Women’s Charter is amended by inserting, immediately after section 121, 
the following Chapter: 
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“CHAPTER 4A — FINANCIAL RELIEF CONSEQUENT ON OVERSEAS 
MATRIMONIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Definitions 
121A. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires— 
“applicant” means the person who applies for an order for financial 
relief; 
“country” includes a territory; 
“judicial or other proceedings” include acts which constitute the means 
by which a divorce may be obtained in a country and which are 
done in compliance with the law of that country; 
“matrimonial asset” has the same meaning as in section 112(10); and 
“order for financial relief” means an order under section 121G of a 
description referred to in that section. 
Applications for financial relief after overseas divorce etc. 
121B. (1) Where— 
(a) a marriage has been dissolved or annulled, or the parties to a 
marriage have been legally separated, by means of judicial or 
other proceedings in an overseas country; and 
(b) the divorce, annulment or legal separation is entitled to be 
recognised as valid in Singapore, 
either party to the marriage may apply to the court in the manner prescribed by 
the Rules of Court for an order for financial relief under this Chapter. 
Jurisdiction of court 
121C. The court shall have jurisdiction to hear an application for an order for 
financial relief only if— 
(a) either of the parties to the marriage was domiciled in Singapore 
on the date of the application for leave under section 121D or 
was so domiciled on the date on which the divorce, annulment or 
judicial separation obtained in a country outside Singapore took 
effect in that country; or 
(b) either of the parties to the marriage was habitually resident in 
Singapore throughout the period of 1 year immediately preceding 
the date of the application for leave under section 121D or was 
so resident throughout the period of 1 year immediately 
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preceding the date on which the divorce, annulment or judicial 
separation obtained in a country outside Singapore took effect in 
that country. 
Leave of court required for applications for financial relief 
121D. (1) No application for an order for financial relief shall be made 
unless the leave of the court has been obtained in accordance with the Rules of 
Court; and the court shall not grant leave unless it considers that there is 
substantial ground for the making of an application for such an order. 
(2) The court may grant leave under this section notwithstanding that an 
order has been made by a court of competent jurisdiction in a country outside 
Singapore requiring the other party to the marriage to make any payment or 
transfer any matrimonial asset to the applicant or a child of the marriage. 
(3) Leave under this section may be granted subject to such conditions as 
the court thinks fit. 
Interim orders for financial provision 
121E. (1) Where leave is granted under section 121D and it appears to the 
court that the applicant or any child of the marriage is in immediate financial 
need, the court may make an interim order for— 
(a) a man to make financial provision for his former wife or any 
child of the marriage; or 
(b) a parent to make financial provision for any child of the 
marriage. 
(2) An interim order under subsection (1) may be made for such term, being 
a term beginning not earlier than the date of the grant of leave and ending with 
the date of the determination of the application for an order for financial relief, 
as the court thinks reasonable. 
(3) An interim order under subsection (1) may be made subject to such 
conditions as the court thinks fit. 
Duty of court to consider whether Singapore is appropriate forum for 
application 
121F. (1) Before making an order for financial relief, the court shall 
consider whether in all the circumstances of the case it would be appropriate for 
such an order to be made by a court in Singapore, and if the court is not satisfied 
that it would be appropriate, the court shall dismiss the application. 
(2) The court shall in particular have regard to the following matters— 
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(a) the connection which the parties to the marriage have with 
Singapore; 
(b) the connection which those parties have with the country in 
which the marriage was dissolved by a decree of divorce, nullity 
or judicial separation; 
(c) the connection which those parties have with any other country 
outside Singapore; 
(d) any financial benefit which the applicant or a child of the 
marriage has received, or is likely to receive, in consequence of 
the divorce, annulment or judicial separation, by virtue of any 
agreement or the operation of the law of a country outside 
Singapore; 
(e) in a case where an order has been made by a court of competent 
jurisdiction in a country outside Singapore requiring the other 
party to the marriage to make any payment or transfer any 
property for the benefit of the applicant or a child of the 
marriage, the financial relief given by the order and the extent to 
which the order has been complied with or is likely to be 
complied with; 
(f) any right which the applicant has, or has had, to apply for 
financial relief from the other party to the marriage under the law 
of any country outside Singapore, and if the applicant has 
omitted to exercise that right the reason for that omission; 
(g) the availability in Singapore of any matrimonial asset in respect 
of which an order under section 121G in favour of the applicant 
could be made; 
(h) the extent to which any order under section 121G is likely to be 
enforceable; and 
(i) the length of time which has elapsed since the date of the 
divorce, annulment or judicial separation. 
Orders for financial relief 
121G. (1) On an application by a party to a marriage for an order for 
financial relief, the court may make any one or more of the orders which it 
could make under sections 112(1), 127(1), or 113 in like manner as if a decree 
of divorce, nullity or judicial separation in respect of the marriage had been 
granted in Singapore. 
(2) Sections 112(2) to (10), 127(2) and 114 to 121 shall apply, with 
necessary modifications, to an order under subsection (1) corresponding to 
orders respectively under sections 112(1), 127(1) and 113. 
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(3) Where the court makes a secured order under subsection (1), then on 
making that order or at any time thereafter, the court may make any order which 
the court would have the power to make if the secured order had been made 
under section 112, 127 or 115. 
Saving 
121H. Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to proceedings or any decree, order 
or judgment made or given in any such proceedings on or before the date of 
entry into force of these provisions. 
121I. Nothing in this Chapter shall apply to a marriage falling within the 
Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap 3, 1999 Rev Ed).” 
Amendment of section 132 
3. Section 132(1) of the Women’s Charter is amended— 
(a) by deleting the word “or” at the end of paragraph (c); 
(b) by deleting the coma at the end of paragraph (d), and substituting the 
word “; or”; and 
(c) by inserting, immediately after paragraph (d), the following 
sub-paragraph: 
“(e) an order has been made under section 121E or 121G and has not 
been rescinded or complied with,”. 
 
